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EAGLE FEATHERS AND EQUALITY: LESSONS
ON RELIGIOUS EXCEPTIONS FROM THE
NATIVE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
KEViN J. WORTHEN*
The legality and propriety of exempting religiously motivated con-
duct from otherwise applicable legal norms is the subject of ongoing
scholarly, judicial, and legislative debate. The issue is particularly
thorny when it arises in a legal system deeply committed to the con-
cept of equality. The Eagle Protection Act, which exempts Native
Americans religious practitioners who are members offederally rec-
ognized tribes from its general prohibition on the taking and use of
bald and golden eagle feathers, provides an interesting context in
which to examine that debate. Not only does the Act exempt relig-
iously motivated conduct from the otherwise applicable norms, it
prefers some religious users (Native Americans who are members of
federally recognized tribes) over other religious users, and does so
on the basis of ancestry and political affiliation. A statutory scheme
which discriminates on the basis of such important matters as reli-
gious preference, ancestry, and political affiliation would seem to
run counter to the concept of equality in a number of respects. Yet a
closer examination of the unique history and status of Native Ameri-
can religions and Native American tribal sovereignty indicate that
the preferential scheme in the statute is, in fact, compatible with the
core concepts of equality.
INTRODUCTION
The bald eagle has been a revered symbol of American values for
two centuries. As Congress has noted, the bird is a "symbolic represen-
tation of a new nation under a new government in a new world... a
symbol of the American ideals of freedom."1  The bald eagle and its
* Dean and Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young Univer-
sity.
1. Bald Eagle Protection Act, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250, 250 (1940) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 668 (2000)). See Antonia M. De Meo, Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts: Envi-
ronmental Protection v. Native American Free Exercise of Religion, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 771, 773 (1995). The bald eagle is so much a symbol of American values that it is com-
monly referred to as the "American eagle." See id. at 773 n.3 (citing THE RANDOM HOUSE
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close relative, the golden eagle, have been revered symbols and essential
parts of many Native American religions for more than two centuries.
2
As the National Park Service has observed with respect to one Native
American tribe, "The eagle serves as the link between the spiritual world
and the physical world of the Hopi, a connection that embodies the very
essence of Hopi spirituality and belief."'3
Unfortunately, while widely revered, the eagle (particularly the bald
eagle) is in short supply. 4 Thus, in 1940, Congress enacted a general
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 47 (1st ed. 1966)). See also United States v.
Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1302 (D.N.M. 1986) (noting American regard for the eagle as "the
symbol of their national unity, strength, and purpose").
The powerful effect of the symbol over time is underscored by the fact that the bald eagle has
achieved such exalted status despite misgivings about the true nature of the bird among some
early influential Americans. Benjamin Franklin famously opined, "I wish the Bald Eagle had
not been chosen as the Representative of our Country; he is a Bird of bad moral Character; like
those among Men who live by Sharping and Robbing, he is generally poor, and often very
lousy. The Turky [sic] is a much more respectable Bird, and withal, a true original Native of
America." United States v. Hetzel, 385 F. Supp. 1311, 1315-16 n. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
2. There are a wide variety of Native American religions, differing from one another in
many ways. Not all Native American religions rely on eagles or eagle feathers, but eagles and
eagle feathers are an indispensable part of many Native American religions. See De Meo, su-
pra note 1, at 774-78.
3. Religious Ceremonial Collection of Golden Eaglets From Wupatki National Monu-
ment, 66 Fed. Reg. 6516, 6517 (proposed Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7). By
way of explanation, the Park Service stated:
The practice of eagle gathering is at the heart of the Hopi religious ceremonial cycle
and the Hopi culture.... Golden eaglets are gathered from nests soon after birth and
are kept and raised to fledglings in Hopi villages. Later, during the Niman Kachina
ceremony, the golden eagles are sacrificed and "sent" to their spiritual home. The
eagles' feathers are subsequently used in all Hopi religious ceremonies such as the
Kachina, Flute, and Snake ceremonies. The cyclical relationship between the eagle
and the Hopi is renewed annually through the practice of eaglet gathering, sustain-
ing the connection between the spiritual and physical worlds for the next generation
of Hopi.
Id.
The centrality of the use of eagles and feathers to the Tribe is underscored by the fact
that the Hopi Constitution, adopted at the urging of the federal government in the 1930's, pro-
vides that "[tlhe Tribal Council shall negotiate with the United States Government agencies
concerned, and with other tribes and other persons concerned, in order to secure protection of
the right of the Hopi Tribe to hunt for eagles in its traditional territories, and to secure adequate
protection for its outlying, established shrines." Id. (quoting Hopi TRIBAL CONST. art. IV).
See Brent Gunson, Cultural Tug of Wars: An Analysis of the Legal Issues Involving the NPS
Proposed Rule to Allow Taking of Golden Eagles at Wupatki National Monument for Religious
Purposes, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 399, 402-03 (2002). See also JOHN D.
LOFTIN, RELIGION AND HOPI LIFE 38-40, 46-48, 50-53, 92-93 (2d ed. 2003).
4. By the 1960's there were fewer than 1,000 breeding pairs of bald eagles in the conti-
nental United States. Amie Jamieson, Will Bald Eagles Remain Compelling Enough to Vali-
date the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act After ESA Delisting? The Ninth Circuit's
Analysis in United States v. Antoine, 34 ENVTL. L. 929, 933 (2004). The population has in-
creased in the last thirty years to the point that there are proposals to delist the bald eagle from
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ban5 on the killing of bald eagles and the possession of any part of a bald
eagle, including its feathers. 6 In 1962, the law was amended to extend
the protection to golden eagles. 7
At the same time, Congress recognized that eagles and eagle feath-
ers play a critical part in many Native American religions. 8 Thus, the
1962 Amendment also authorized the Secretary of Interior to issue per-
mits allowing the taking, possession, or use of bald and golden eagles
and their feathers "for the religious purposes of Indian tribes." 9
Acting pursuant to this grant of authority, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service promulgated regulations that allow Native Americans to apply
for permits authorizing the use and possession of eagles and eagle feath-
ers for religious purposes.10 The Secretary of the Interior satisfies the
authorized requests for eagle feathers through a National Eagle Reposi-
tory in Commerce City, Colorado to which all federal and state agents
the Endangered Species List. See Proposed Rule to Remove the Bald Eagle in the Lower 48
States from the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,454, 36,454-62
(proposed July 6, 1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The proposed rule would not,
however, remove the bald eagle from the protection provided by the Eagle Protection Act. Id.
at 36,454. See Jamieson, supra, at 935.
5. The 1940 Act did contain some limited exceptions. See infra note 9.
6. Bald Eagle Protection Act, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250, 251 (1940) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 668 (2000)). The Act makes it a crime to "take, possess, sell, purchase, barter,
offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import, at any time or in any manner, any
bald eagle, commonly known as the American eagle... or any part ... thereof .. " Id.
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"), enacted in 1918, prohibits the taking of certain
birds, including the bald eagle. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000). The MBTA currently acts as a
"useful, supplemental mechanism to the Eagle Protection Act to prevent unauthorized takings
of eagles." De Meo, supra note 1, at 782. See also Jamieson, supra note 4, at 939. The bald
eagle is also protected by the Endangered Species Act. See De Meo, supra note 1, at 783-85;
Jamieson, supra note 4, at 940-42.
7. See Golden Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (1962) (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2000)). Protection was extended to golden eagles in part be-
cause the eaglets of the two birds are difficult to distinguish. Thus, "protection of the golden
eagle will afford greater protection for the bald eagle.. . because the bald eagle is often killed
by persons mistaking it for the golden eagle." Id.
8. See supra note 3 (describing religious significance of eagles to the Hopi).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2000). The 1940 Act already authorized exceptions for "scientific
or exhibition purposes of public museums, scientific societies, or zoological parks" or when "it
is necessary to permit the taking of such eagles for the protection of wildlife or of agricultural
or other interests in any particular locality ...." Bald Eagle Protection Act, ch. 278, 54 Stat.
250, 251 (1940) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2000)). In addition to the Native
American religious use exception, the 1962 Act authorized "the taking of golden eagles for the
purpose of seasonally protecting domesticated flocks and herds .... 16 U.S.C. § 668a
(2000). The current version also authorizes an exception for falconry purposes under certain
circumstances. See id. All exceptions are subject to the requirement that the permitted activity
be "compatible with the preservation" of the species. Id.
10. 50 C.F.R. §§ 22.1, 22.22 (2004).
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send deceased eagles." 1 Feathers are generally 12 distributed to author-
ized permitees on a first-come, first-serve basis, 13 but demand consis-
tently exceeds supply, 14 and there is often a delay of at least several
months before authorized orders are filled. 15
Consistent with the statutory emphasis on Indian "tribes," rather
than individuals, the current regulations provide that a permit will issue
only if the applicant is a member of a federally recognized tribe16 who is
participating "in bona fide tribal religious ceremonies." 17
On its face, this scheme discriminates against (1) most 18 non-
religious users of eagle feathers, (2) religious users who are non-Native
Americans, and (3) Native American religious users who are not mem-
bers of a federally recognized tribe. Thus, the current scheme raises
three key questions:
(1) Can religious exemptions from generally applicable laws be jus-
tified?
(2) Can religious exemptions which discriminate against non-Native
Americans in favor of Native Americans be justified?
11. See United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2002); Jamieson, su-
pra note 4, at 938. Eagles die from a wide variety of causes, including car collisions, electro-
cution, natural causes, and poaching. Jamieson, supra note 4, at 938.
12. There is an exception to this order for "death ceremonies and other emergencies."
Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1123 n.12.
13. See Hardman, 297 F.3d at I 123; Jamieson, supra note 4, at 938.
14. "The National Eagle Repository receives about 1,000 eagles every year and there are
approximately 5,000 people on the waiting list to receive eagles." Jamieson, supra note 4, at
938.
15. See United States v. Oliver, 255 F.3d 588, 589 (8th Cir. 2001) (alleging delay of up to
three years).
16. Tribes may be federally recognized by an "Act of Congress; ... administrative pro-
cedures... ; or by a decision of a United States court." Federally Recognized Indian Tribe
List Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-454, § 103(3), 108 Stat. 4791 (1994) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 479a (2000)). The list of federally recognized tribes is published annually. 25 U.S.C.
§ 479a-1 (2000). As of 2002, there were 562 federally recognized tribes, over 200 of which
were in Alaska. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,328, 46,328-33 (July 12, 2002). See
generally Mark D. Myers, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United States, 12 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REv. 271 (2001).
17. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Dept. of the Interior Eagle Permits Rule, 50 C.F.R. §
22.22 (2004). As required by the statute, the Secretary must also determine that the permitted
activity is compatible with the preservation of the species. Id.; see 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2000).
The regulations also contain other limitations on the use of the feathers (for example, they
cannot be transferred to another except when "handed down from generation to generation or
from one Indian to another in accordance with tribal or religious customs"). U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Serv., Dept. of the Interior Eagle Permits Rule, 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2004).
18. There are limited exceptions for some non-religious uses. See supra note 9.
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(3) Can religious exemptions which discriminate against Native
Americans who are not members of a federally recognized tribe in favor
of those who are be justified?
While the fist question is a familiar one to law and religion schol-
ars, 19 the second and third questions, on which this article focuses, re-
ceive much less attention. Analysis of those two questions (which center
on the Native American experience with religious liberty) may provide
some insight into the proper resolution of the broader, and more funda-
mental first question.
The article is organized into three sections. The first describes re-
cent legal challenges to the preferential religious exceptions in the cur-
rent eagle protection scheme. It concludes that the various analyses
courts of appeals have employed to assess the legality of the scheme are
inadequate and confusing, stemming in large part from the courts' failure
to address directly the issue at the heart of the controversy-the fairness
of granting preferential treatment to some, but not all, religious practitio-
ners.
Section two-the main focus of the article-sets forth possible jus-
tifications for this seemingly inequitable treatment. It concludes that in
some situations, including the kind of zero-sum situation which exists
with respect to eagle feather use, there are valid reasons why the law
should protect the religious practices of Native Americans who are
members of federally recognized tribes even though similar protection
may not be in order for any other members of our society.
Section three sets forth some tentative insights which the Native
American experience with eagle feathers may provide for the larger de-
bate about the feasibility and desirability of religious exceptions to gen-
erally applicable laws. While far from complete, the analysis suggests
that there are at least some situations in which legislatively created reli-
gious exceptions may satisfy the requirements of both liberty and equal-
ity to an acceptable degree.
19. This question is the subject of an ongoing debate that at its heart involves the perhaps
irreconcilable tension between the two core American values of liberty and equality. See, e.g.,
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Accommodation and Equal Liberty, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1007
(2001); William P. Marshall, What is the Matter With Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal
Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193
(2000); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of
Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITrLE RoCK L. REv. 555 (1998); Philip A. Hamburger, A
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 915 (1992).
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I. BALANCING COMPETING COMPELLING INTERESTS: THE EAGLE
PROTECTION ACT UNDER THE RELGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION
ACT ("RFRA")
The initial legal challenges to the preference provisions of the Eagle
Protection Act were brought by Native American members of federally
recognized tribes who claimed that the Act's permit requirement violated
their treaty and constitutional rights. These claims ultimately proved un-
successful. 20
The most recent round of litigation, on the other hand, has been ini-
tiated largely by those not eligible for permits21 who have challenged the
20. The first direct challenge to the scheme involved Jose Abeyta, a member of the Isleta
Pueblo, a federally recognized tribe in New Mexico. See United States v. Abeyta, 632 F.
Supp. 1301, 1303 (D.N.M. 1986). In 1985, without obtaining a permit, Abeyta killed a golden
eagle within the boundaries of the Isleta Reservation for the "sole purpose" of obtaining its
feathers for use in the "religious ceremonies of the Katsina Society." Id. at 1303. When
Abyeta was subsequently charged with possession of the feathers without a permit, the federal
district court dismissed the charges for two reasons: 1) the prosecution violated a provision of
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which guaranteed all Mexican citizens residing in the terri-
tory in 1848 (including members of the Isleta Pueblo) would be "secured in the free exercise of
their religion without restriction," Id. at 1304-05 (citing Article IX of the Treaty), and 2) the
prosecution violated Abeyta's First Amendment free exercise right because infringement on
his religious practices was not the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling govern-
mental interest (the prevailing constitutional test at the time). Id. at 1307. In reaching the lat-
ter ruling the court indicated that the government did not have a compelling interest in protect-
ing golden eagles because, unlike its bald counterpart, golden eagles were not an endangered
species, and moreover, the permit system was not the least restrictive means of protecting the
birds because it was "cumbersome, intrusive and demonstrates a palpable insensitivity to In-
dian religious beliefs." Id. The court noted in particular that the regulations permitted some
"deprecating golden eagles" to be killed by ranchers, id., even though there were not enough
birds in the depository to meet Indian religious needs. Id. at 1303-04.
The bases of these two potential defenses were soon swept aside by two Supreme
Court rulings. In United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745 (1986), the Court held that the 1962
amendments to the Eagle Protection Act abrogated any prior treaty rights, and in Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982)), the Supreme Court rejected the compelling state interest test, ruling that the First
Amendment "right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability' such as the Eagle Protection Act, which
prohibits all taking and possession of eagles and eagle feathers (not just those for religious
purposes).
A third potential defense to prosecutions of Native American religionists under the
Eagle Protection Act-that they violate the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
("AIRFA"), which expresses a federal policy to "protect and preserve for American Indians
their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise [their] traditional religions,"
42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2000),-was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's ruling in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass 'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988), that AIRFA created no judicially
enforceable rights.
21. Some RFRA claims have been made by Native Americans who are members of a
federally recognized tribe-those most favorably treated by the federal scheme. Those courts
which have directly addressed the issue have unanimously ruled that the permit requirement
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scheme under RFRA. 22 Consistent with the terms of that statute, these
claimants allege that the scheme's failure to allow them to even apply for
a permit "substantially burdens" their "free exercise of religion" and that
the preferential scheme is not the "least restrictive means" of achieving
any "compelling governmental interest. '23 This latest round of litigation
has left the law with respect to the Eagle Protection Act's religious ex-
ception in a state of confusion. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have re-
jected RFRA challenges to the preferential scheme, 24 but for quite dif-
ferent (though equally problematic) reasons. The Tenth Circuit, on the
other hand, has upheld one challenge to the scheme, 25 but under reason-
ing that is itself problematic. These cases have proceeded in almost a
point-counterpoint fashion, with each succeeding case rebutting the rea-
soning of its immediate predecessor, adding to the confusion about the
legality of the scheme and muddying the proper analysis to be used in
making that determination.
The Eleventh Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to weigh
in on the matter. In Gibson v. Babbitt, the court rejected a RFRA chal-
lenge brought by a Native American who was not eligible for a permit
because the tribe to which he belonged was not federally recognized. 2 6
The court concluded that although Gibson's inability to file for a permit
(and hence his inability to legally secure any eagle feathers for religious
purposes) substantially burdened the free exercise of his religion, the
limitations imposed on permit eligibility were the least restrictive means
of furthering the government's compelling interest in "fulfilling its treaty
does not violate RFRA. See United States v. Oliver, 255 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Jim, 888 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Or.
1995). In each case, the court determined that, contrary to the reasoning in Abeyta, and despite
the fact that the permit scheme results in delays of up to two to three years, the federal gov-
ermnent has a compelling interest in preserving the bald eagle, and that the permit system, at
least on its face, is the least restrictive means of advancing that goal. Oliver, 255 F.3d at 589;
Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1378; Jim, 888 F. Supp. at 1063-65.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000). RFRA was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Act purported to reinstate
statutorily the strict scrutiny test (requiring the government to show that actions substantially
burdening religion are the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental in-
terest) which the Smith Court had rejected as a constitutional test. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1
(2000). While the Supreme Court subsequently invalidated RFRA's application to state ac-
tions, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), lower courts have agreed that it still ap-
plies to federal action, see, e.g., Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2001),
thereby leaving open the claim that the federal government's enactment and enforcement of
the Eagle Protection Act scheme violates RFRA.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000).
24. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003); Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d
1256 (1 th Cir. 2000).
25. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002).
26. Gibson, 223 F.3d at 1257-58.
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obligations with federally recognized tribes."'27 Without elaborating on
why protection of any such rights constituted a compelling governmental
interest, the court concluded that restricting permit eligibility to federally
recognized tribes was the least restrictive means of furthering that inter-
est because the demand for feathers by members of federally recognized
tribes exceeded the current supply.28 Therefore, the court concluded,
any expansion of the permit eligibility pool would result in an increase in
the delay already experienced by members of federally recognized tribes,
"thereby vitiating the govemment[']s efforts to fulfill its treaty obliga-
tions ... ."29
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis seems inadequate for several rea-
sons. First, not all federally recognized tribes (those who benefit from
the current scheme) have entered into treaty relationships with the federal
government. Moreover, not all treaties which do exist protect the right to
take or use eagle feathers. More fundamentally, the Eleventh Circuit
failed to mention-let alone deal with-the fact that in United States v.
Dion the United States Supreme Court held that the 1962 amendments to
the Eagle Protection Act abrogated any prior treaty rights.30 The court
thus seemed to allow the preference to stand without subjecting it to the
close scrutiny that RFRA requires.
In an opinion addressing three different cases (one involving a Na-
tive American whose tribe was not recognized by the federal govern-
ment 31 and two involving non-Native American practitioners of Native
American religions 32) the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the
treaty right argument adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, finding that it
"lack[ed] merit."'33 The Tenth Circuit concluded, however, that the fed-
eral government had two other compelling interests in limiting eligibility
27. Id. at 1258. Having concluded that the government had met its burden with respect to
one compelling interest, the court left unresolved whether preservation of Native American
religions qualified as a separate one. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745 (1986). See supra note 20.
31. Joseluis Saenz was a Chiricahua Apache. While some Chiricahua Apache were
members of other federally recognized tribes, the Chiricahua themselves have not been a fed-
erally recognized tribe since at least 1866. Hardnan, 297 F.3d at 1119.
32. Raymond Hardman had been married to a member of the S'Kallum Tribe, a federally
recognized tribe in Washington, had two children who were members of that tribe, and resided
on the Uintah Ouray Reservation in Utah. Id. at 1118. He obtained the feathers at issue from a
Hopi tribal religious leader to keep in a truck used to transport the body of his son's godfather
to Arizona for a religious cleansing ceremony. Id. Samuel Wilgus claimed to be an adopted
member of the Paiute Tribe of Utah, although tribal law did not recognize adopted non-Indian
members. Id. at 1119 n.3.
33. Id. at 1129 n.19. The court further observed that the permit exception was limited to
"religious uses" while the treaty rights protected the broader right to hunt eagles. Id.
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for eagle permits to Native American religionists who were members of
federally recognized tribes: (1) preservation of the eagle population;34
and (2) protecting Native American cultures and religions from "extinc-
tion."35
Notwithstanding its conclusion that the government had two com-
pelling reasons to limit the distribution of eagle feathers as outlined in
the Eagle Protection Act, the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of the chal-
lengers because the government had failed to establish that the permit
scheme was the least restrictive means of achieving those interests. 36 In
reaching that conclusion, the court refused to rely on the logical infer-
ences drawn by the Eleventh Circuit from the fact that demand for eagle
feathers exceeded supply. Instead, the Tenth Circuit required that the
government actually prove in each case that the two compelling interests
(preserving the eagle population and protecting Native American cultures
and religion from extinction) could not be achieved by any other
means.
37
The Tenth Circuit refused to presume, in the absence of an affirma-
tive showing, that increasing the number of eligible applicants would
place increased pressure on eagle populations, noting that the result
might simply be a longer wait for those with authorized permits. 38
While a longer wait might impact the rights of those already eligible for
permits (members of federally recognized tribes), the court found that
such an impact did not affect the government's interest in preserving ea-
gles. 39
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the government could
not rest on the assumption that expansion of the pool of eligible permit-
tees would inevitably undermine the government's other compelling in-
terest: preserving Native American cultures and religions. The court
noted that the government had not shown that "broader eligibility would
34. Id. at 1128.
35. Id. The Court noted that Congress' power to regulate Commerce with Indian Tribes,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, gave rise to an "obligation of trust to protect the rights and interests of
federally recognized tribes and to promote their self-determination" and that this "historical
obligation to respect Native American sovereignty and to protect Native American culture,"
gave rise to this compelling interest. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Rupert v. Director,
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1992)).
36. The government had failed to meet its burden in Wilgus and Hardman because the
issue had not been raised below. Id. at 1131. Thus, the court remanded the two cases to allow
the government an opportunity to make the requisite showing. Id. In Saenz, by contrast, the
court ruled that the government had been given the opportunity, but had failed to meet its bur-
den. Id.
37. Id. at 1129-30.
38. Id. at 1132.
39. Id.
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result in an increased wait substantial enough to endanger Native Ameri-
can cultures." 40 Furthermore, the court observed, the government had
failed to show that allowing non-tribal members who practice Native
American religions to share in the use of eagle feathers would impede
Native American culture at all. "Allowing a wider variety of people to
participate in Native American religion could just as easilyfoster Native
American culture and religion by exposing it to a wider array of per-
sons."
41
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning is problematic in at least two re-
spects. First, it seems to prefer the preservation of eagles over the pres-
ervation of Native American culture without expressing any justification
for such a preference. The court characterized the former as an interest
in "preserving eagle populations"42 (which could be read to mean pre-
venting any diminution in the number of eagles), while it characterized
the latter as an interest in protecting "Indian cultures" not just from dimi-
nution, but "from extinction." 43 Similarly, the court held with respect to
the former interest that the government had not shown that expanding the
applicant pool would have any impact on the eagle population 44 (imply-
ing, perhaps, that such a showing might make a difference), while the
government's failure with respect to the latter was that it had not shown
that the harm to Native American culture was "substantial enough to en-
danger" those cultures, quite a different standard.45
Second, the court wholly failed to take into account the relationship
between Native American culture and tribal sovereignty, as well as the
role the latter can arguably play in promoting the former, a point that
Judge Murphy made in his concurrence. 46 If there is such a relationship,
and if the government has an interest in preserving both tribal culture and
tribal sovereignty (as argued below), then whether a particular tribal
group's indigenous culture is fostered or harmed by the participation of
non-tribal members is a question that should be answered by the tribe,
not the courts.
40. Id. at 1133.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1128,
43. Id.
44. The court noted that "[p]resumably, expanding the permit process to include non-
Native American adherents would have no effect on bird populations." Id. at 1132 (emphasis
added).
45. Id. at 1133.
46. Id. at 1138 n.3 (Murphy, J., concurring) ("I see the contours of the government's
compelling interest a little differently: guaranteeing members of sovereign and semi-
autonomous Indian nations the ability to carry on their traditional way of life.").
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By committing these two possible errors, the Tenth Circuit may
have rendered the federal government's task unduly difficult. By failing
to recognize that the government's competing interests in preserving the
eagle population and Native American culture are perhaps equally
weighty, the court may have underestimated the difficult balance the fed-
eral government has to reach, 47 thereby making it harder for the govern-
ment to show that it was doing the best that could be done given the
competing interests involved. By failing to take into account the gov-
ernment's interest in preserving tribal sovereignty, the court may have
undervalued the strength and nature of the government's full interests,
again arguably failing to provide the government sufficient leeway to
meet the already high demands of the statute. 48
Moreover, by remanding two of the cases to allow the government
an opportunity to make the requisite showing (if such a showing is possi-
ble), the Tenth Circuit created the possibility that the law will develop in
an incremental, fact-specific way. Such an approach may be beneficial
in some respects, but it is unlikely to satisfactorily resolve the fundamen-
tal question of the fairness of granting preferential treatment to some, but
not all, religious practioners since it does not directly address the issue in
terms of equality.
In the latest round of circuit court litigation on the issue, the Ninth
Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit in rejecting RFRA claims by indige-
nous persons who are ineligible for permits because their tribe is not rec-
ognized by the federal government. 49 In doing so, the court first rejected
the reasoning in Hardman, concluding that the Tenth Circuit had indeed
made the government's RFRA task too onerous.50 Since the supply of
eagle feathers is fixed and since demand exceeds supply, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reasoned, the "inescapable result" of increasing the number of those
47. The court did acknowledge the government's need to balance its competing interests
in preserving the eagle population and protecting Native American culture. Id. at 1134. The
court, however, did not fully consider the relative weight of the two interests, or fully consider
whether the government had done the best it could in striking that balance. Instead, the court
concluded that the government failed by neglecting to demonstrate how it had struck the bal-
ance. Id. at 1135.
48. As Judge Murphy noted, under one view of the majority's statement of the govern-
ment's interest, it is difficult to "imagine what evidence the government could produce on re-
mand in Hardman and Wilgus to demonstrate that the current regulatory scheme is the least
restrictive means of balancing the compelling yet competing interests." Id. at 1138 n.3 (Mur-
phy, J., concurring).
49. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003). Antoine was a member of the
Cowichan Band of the Salish Indian Tribe, a Canadian tribe not recognized by the U.S. gov-
ernment. Id. at 920.
50. Id. at 923 ("We do not believe RFRA requires the government to make the showing
the Tenth Circuit demands of it.").
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eligible to receive eagle feathers is a corresponding decrease in the num-
ber of those already eligible who will actually receive feathers. 51 Unlike
the Eleventh Circuit, however, the Ninth Circuit did not rule that this line
of logic automatically established that the government had met its burden
under RFRA. Instead, it concluded that in situations such as these, in
which two religious groups are involved in a zero-sum conflict, there is
no RFRA claim at all. 52 "If the freeway must be built," the court ob-
served, "RFRA doesn't say which house of worship should be razed."
53
This reasoning is not without its own problems. Although the Ninth
Circuit is surely correct that it is difficult to determine in a judicial pro-
ceeding "the relative burdens a policy inflicts on religious adherents," 54
RFRA arguably imposes just such a duty on the courts, at least in zero-
sum situations. Not every burden on a religion triggers RFRA protec-
tion. It is only when the burden is "substantial" that the statute comes
into play. Thus, if a particular government action substantially burdens
one religious practice, while incidentally, though not substantially, bur-
dening another, and if adoption of a second alternative could decrease the
harm to the first religion below the substantial burden threshold, without
increasing it above that threshold for the other religion, RFRA would
seem to require that the government adopt the second alternative in order
to minimize the impact on one religion, though it comes at the expense of
the other.
Thus, if the Tenth Circuit made the government's task too difficult,
given the arguable need to equally balance conflicting compelling inter-
ests, the Ninth Circuit was arguably not demanding enough, either of the
government-which should have been required to make some showing
as to whether its actions were required to avoid "substantial" burdens on
both religions-or of the judiciary, which is required under RFRA to
make difficult determinations about how much religious harm is enough
to trigger strict scrutiny.
The latest round of litigation, therefore, has done little to clarify the
legality of the current preferential scheme. The courts cannot agree on
either the proper reasoning or the proper result. They clearly are strug-
51. Id.
52. The court explained: "Antoine isn't asking the government to pursue its eagle-
protection goal without burdening religion at all; he wants it to burden other people's religion
more and his religion less. This is not a viable RFRA claim; an alternative can't fairly be
called 'less restrictive' if it places additional burdens on other believers. A contrary holding
would entangle the judiciary in standardless efforts to measure the relative burdens a policy
inflicts on other religious adherents. This is not what the statute prescribes." Id. at 923-24
(citation omitted).
53. 1d. at 924.
54. Id.
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gling to know how to address challenges to the existing scheme. The
likely reason for the struggle is that there are competing, compelling in-
terests at play on both sides of the matter. However, contrary to what
one might think from reading the opinions, the key competing interests
are not the government's interest in preserving eagles and its interest in
protecting Native American culture, but, more fundamentally, the gov-
ernment's interest in promoting religious liberty, on the one hand, and its
interest in promoting equality, on the other.
Both the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits noted that the real question at
the heart of the matter is whether, in a legal system committed to the
concept of equality, exemptions granted in the name of religious liberty
can justifiably be granted to some religion practitioners and not others.55
However, neither those courts nor the Eleventh Circuit directly addressed
that issue56-a difficult issue that is complicated by the fact that prefer-
ential treatment is tied to race and political affiliation.
Therefore, the critical question for determining the legality of the
Eagle Protection Act's preferential scheme is one the lower courts have
so far hinted at, but avoided: in a system committed to equality, can there
ever be a justification for discriminating among religions based on blood
and politics? While courts and litigants in the latest round of litigation
have avoided the issue by the way they framed the question under
RFRA, ultimately the issue must be addressed because it is at the core of
the matter, regardless of whether the specific claim is raised under
55. See United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1135 (10th Cir. 2002) ("The question
at the heart of this case is why an individual who is not a member of a federally recognized
tribe is foreclosed from applying for a permit that may be used as a defense to criminal prose-
cution for possession of eagle feathers, while an identically situated individual may apply for a
permit if she is a member of a federally recognized tribe."). The Ninth Circuit described the
question as follows:
[I]n this case, the burden on religion is inescapable; the only question is whom to
burden and how much. Both member and nonmember Indians seek to use eagles for
religious purposes. The government must decide whether to distribute eagles nar-
rowly and thus burden nonmembers, or distribute them broadly and exacerbate the
extreme delays already faced by members. Religion weighs on both sides of the
scale."
United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003).
56. The Tenth Circuit avoided the question because it concluded that the government had
not sufficiently explained the reasons for its preferential scheme.
The government's interest in preserving eagles might have something to do with the
total number of people who are allowed to acquire eagle feathers, but it quite possi-
bly has little to do with the question here, which is how those permits are distrib-
uted. We do not, however, have a sufficient factual record to state even that conclu-
sion with certainty ....
Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1135. The Ninth Circuit avoided the question by holding that RFRA
had no bearing on the question. Antoine, 318 F.3d at 923-24.
10012005]
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the Equal
Protection Clause. Ultimately, a satisfactory answer to that core question
demands analysis at a level of abstraction that transcends any particular
legal claim. The next section therefore attempts to determine whether
the Eagle Protection Act's preferential scheme is compatible with the ba-
sic demands of equality.
II. MEETING THE DEMANDS OF EQUALITY: CAN THE CURRENT SCHEME
BE JUSTIFIED?
The basic demand of equality is that like cases be treated alike.57
That concept is largely meaningless, however, until one determines the
relevant points of comparison. 58 As Professor Steven Smith has pointed
out in his seminal work on equality and religious liberty, "every person is
in different ways both like and unlike every other person." 59 The key is
to determine the relevant comparative characteristic. In this case, it is
religion. Religious discrimination in favor of Native Americans and
against non-Native Americans, and religious discrimination in favor of
Native Americans who are members of federally recognized tribes and
against those who are not, are justifiable, in equality terms,60 only to the
extent the discrimination reflects a corresponding difference in the situa-
tion of the groups with respect to religion. It is not enough to show that
the groups are different from one another in some respect. The differ-
ences must be differences in their situations with respect to religion, and
those differences must be sufficient to justify governmental preference of
the religion of one of the groups over the other, at least when there is
conflict between the groups, as is arguably the case under the Eagle Pro-
tection Act.
57. STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALITY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 13 (2001).
58. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1982).
59. SMITH, supra note 57, at 13.
60. One could attempt to justify preferential treatment on other terms. For example, one
could argue that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply at all to preferential treatment for
Native Americans, see, e.g., David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause:
Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991), or that the Indian Commerce Clause grants
Congress extraordinary latitude to grant preferential treatment to Native Americans, see, e.g.,
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly" Racial: A Response to "Indians as Peoples, " 39
UCLA L. REV. 169 (1991). One might also arguably justify preferential treatment on purely
remedial grounds-as a means of remedying the effects of past discrimination. See infra notes
77-86 and accompanying text. My intent, however, is to justify the preferential treatment
solely in terms of the demands of equality in a broad philosophical sense. Thus, while the ar-
gument borrows strands from these other efforts to justify preferential treatment, it is more
focused on equality in general and religious equality in particular.
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Because the current scheme precludes the religious use of eagle
feathers by both non-Native Americans and Native Americans who are
not members of a federally recognized tribe, it can be justified only if
both (1) religious discrimination in favor of Native Americans and (2)
religious discrimination in favor of federally recognized tribes can be
justified in the terms set forth above. Each question will be addressed in
turn.
A. Religious Preferences for All Native Americans: What's Blood
Got to Do with It?
Are Native Americans differently situated from non-Native Ameri-
cans with respect to religion in a way that might justify differential
treatment in a system committed to the principle of equality? Arguably,
the answer is yes, for four interconnected reasons.
First, Native Americans are different from any other ethnic or reli-
gious group in the United States in one fundamental historical way-
their ancestors were here first. Indeed, that is what makes indigenous
groups indigenous. That simple fact has several significant implica-
tions.61 For present purposes, the critical ones are that (1) Native Ameri-
can cultures differ from other cultures because of the unique way in
which they were incorporated into the larger American culture, and (2)
Native American cultures differ from other cultures because they were
created, shaped, and most importantly, exist, only here.
Because they were here first, Native American cultures became part
of our nation in a unique way-not, as with most cultures, as a result of
their ancestors' conscious decision to leave their prior cultures and join
with that being created here-but as a result of having a larger culture
imposed upon them. That experience necessarily affects the way in
which Native American culture has developed. For example, immigrant
cultures typically link admiration of the larger American culture with
veneration for ancestors, because those ancestors at some point found
enough good in American culture to induce them to abandon their prior
one it its favor.62 By contrast, veneration of ancestors in indigenous cul-
61. See PATRICK MACKLEM, INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
CANADA 47-131 (2001).
62. Of course not all groups came to the United States by choice. African Americans
who are the descendants of slaves brought here by force arguably have their own distinctive
culture, which in this respect seems more similar to that of Native Americans than any other
ethnic group. However, Native American culture is distinct from African American culture
when it comes to the other, more fundamental, implication of their aboriginal status: their cul-
ture exists only here. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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tures often requires rejection of the larger culture. 63  Thus, Native
American culture is quite distinctive among American cultures.
More importantly, because of the second implication of their abo-
riginal status, Native American culture is truly unique among American
cultures in that if Native American cultures cease to exist here, they will
be extinct. 64 This fact is highly significant in a legal scheme committed
to cultural pluralism. Just as the federal government has a compelling
interest in preventing the extinction of bald eagles and other endangered
species, it could well have a compelling interest in preserving endan-
gered cultures, 65 especially those whose roots and current manifestations
exist only in the United States.66 Thus, because they were here first, Na-
tive American cultures are situated differently from those of any other
group in the United States in a way that could justify some extra legal
protection.
However, that distinction does not, on its own, justify religious dis-
crimination. There must be some link to religion before that kind of le-
gal distinction can be justified. A portion of that link is provided by a
second distinctive feature of many Native American religions: they are
holistic and integrated in the sense that there is no separation between re-
ligion and other aspects of life. 67 Unlike most traditional Western relig-
63. As one Canadian scholar has noted, "unlike other groups... Aboriginal people did
not choose to immigrate to Canada and accept pre-existing laws that conflict with their cultural
practices." MACKLEM, supra note 61, at 60 (citing THOMAS R. BERGER, FRAGILE FREEDOMS:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISSENT IN CANADA 244 (1981)). See also id. at 73 (discussing Will
Kymlicka's distinction between national minorities (which have been incorporated into larger
nation states) and ethnic groups consisting of immigrants who leave their native culture in fa-
vor of that of their adopted country).
64. As Carole Goldberg-Ambrose has noted, "unlike other American ethnic groups, Indi-
ans cannot rely on perpetuation of their tradition in a home country abroad. If Indian culture
vanishes in America, it vanishes altogether." Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 60, at 184.
65. See Williams, supra note 60, at 816 ("The government has an interest, perhaps a
compelling one, in seeing that these groups have the opportunity to express their heritage, for
their own benefit and the benefit of the nation.").
66. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 60, at 184 n.77 ("The justification for Indian clas-
sifications based on their contribution to cultural diversification draws strength from the fact
that Native American culture must survive in America if it is to survive at all.").
67. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 459-60
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[F]or most Native Americans, the area of worship cannot be
delineated from social, political, cultural, and other areas of Indian lifestyle." (internal quota-
tion marks and brackets omitted)); William K. Powers & Kathleen J. Martin, North American
Indians: Indians of the Plains in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 6698 (2d ed. 2005) (For
most Native American tribes "spirituality and a relationship to the sacred permeate daily life,
and most Indian languages do not have specific terms for the word religion."); Anastasia P.
Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native Ameri-
can Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 1291, 1295 (1996) ("For Native Americans, the spiritual
life is not separate from the secular life."). See generally Robert S. Michaelsen, American In-
dian Religious Freedom Litigation: Promise and Perils, 3 J.L. & RELIGION 47, 62-63 (1985).
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ions, which distinguish the "religious" or "sacred" sphere of life from the
secular, Native American religions tend to view everything as religious
or sacred. 68 Religion therefore permeates every aspect of life for many
Native Americans. Even seemingly mundane daily tasks, such as hunt-
ing,69 planting crops,70 weaving, 71 or preparing food are religious acts
imbued with sacred meaning. Thus, for many Native Americans, culture
is the same as religion, 72 and most unique features of Native American
cultures are in fact unique religious features-features that potentially
distinguish Native American religions from others in the United States-
and features that would not exist if Native American religions were not
protected. Thus, the justifications for extra legal protection for Native
American cultures which arise as a result of their aboriginal status often
transform into justifications for special protection for Native American
religions. 73
This aspect of Native American religions has proved a stumbling block to Native American
free exercise claimants, who are forced to categorize their beliefs and actions in terms that
make little sense to them. See Dorothea Theodoratus, Cultural Resources of the Chimney Rock
Section, Gasquet-Orleans, in READINGS IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: RECALLING THE
RHYTHM OF SuRvivAL 302 (Jo Carrillo ed., 1998) ("Because of the particular nature of the
Indian perceptual experience... any division into 'religious' or 'sacred' is in reality an exer-
cise which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian categories, and distorts the original concep-
tualization in the process.").
68. As Professor Robert Michaelsen has observed: "The typical western approach is to
split reality into separate categories which can be objectified and labeled 'church,' 'religion,'
'culture,' 'art,' 'economics,' 'politics,' etc. But the use of this common approach in dealing
with traditional Indian realities rends the seamless garment of Indian life." Robert S. Michael-
sen, American Indian Religious Freedom Litigation: Promise and Perils, 3 J. LAW AND
RELIGION 47, 62 (1985). In the words of one member of the Crow Tribe, "[t]he area of wor-
ship cannot be delineated from social, political, cultural, and other areas of Indian lifestyle,
including his general outlook upon economic and resource development." Id. at 62-63.
69. As one Hoopa woman testified before Congress: "[T]o most people, hunting and fish-
ing [sic] is a sport. To the American Indian it is a part of religious custom.... [E]ven the tak-
ing of food was a religious sacrament in a way, particular [sic] in regard to the hunting of
deer." Theodoratus, supra note 67, at 302.
70. See Loftin, supra note 3, at 4-12 (describing religious nature of Hopi farming).
71. See id. at 3-4 (describing interlinkage between religious and practical aspects of Hopi
weaving).
72. As one scholar observed with respect to the Hopi culture:
The culture is completely religious and therefore completely consistent. If you
wrote an essay on Hopi farming, it would be an essay on Hopi religion; on Hopi
hunting, it would be an essay on Hopi religion; an essay on Hopi family life would
be an essay on Hopi religion; on Hopi games the same - everything they do and
think is about their religion.
Hugh Nibley, Promised Lands, Address Before the Bill of Rights Symposium (October 9,
1992), in CLARK MEMORANDUM, Spring 1993, at 5-6.
73. That Native American religious cultures continue to exist is potentially critical not
only to religious freedom, but also to other aspects of American life. As the Supreme Court
noted in Yoder, important values have been preserved by religious cultures throughout the
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A third distinctive feature of Native American religions provides a
further significant differentiating basis. Unlike most mainstream relig-
ions in the United States, many Native American religions consider land
a living, sacred thing.74 They consider specific sites as sacred not just
because they are the necessary location for important religious rites and
ceremonies, but also because they are holy in and of themselves. 75
Moreover, because of the indigenous nature of their culture (reflecting
the historical fact that they were here first), Native American sacred sites
are located only here. While a few non-Native American religions may
revere certain sites in the United States, few, if any, have a connection
with specific United States sites (and no others) that is as deep-seated as
that of many Native American religions. And, the impact of that deep-
seated religious connection to these sacred sites sometimes extends be-
yond the geographic location of the site. Eagle feathers used in tradi-
tional Hopi ceremonies, for example, must be gathered from specific ar-
eas outside the villages where the ceremonies occur (indeed, outside the
Hopi reservation) in order to realize the full religious purposes of the
feathers and the ceremony. 76
ages. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972). See also Smith, supra note 57,
at 101-02. Indeed, for those who perceive and lament a growth in materialism and a dimin-
ishment in spirituality, the continued existence of Native American religion may provide valu-
able lessons in how that trend can be resisted.
74. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED 148-49 (2d ed. 1992).
75. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (describing Navajo
belief that the San Francisco Peaks in Arizona are "the home of specific deities and ... the
body of a spiritual being or god" and Navajo practice of "pray[ing] directly to the Peaks
[which they] regard... as a living deity"); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir.
1980) (describing Navajo belief that Rainbow Bridge and surrounding areas are "the incarnate
forms of Navajo gods," whose sacred nature is "desecrated... by noise, litter and defacement
of the Bridge" by visiting tourists).
76. As the National Park Service explained:
Only a few of the Hopi clan and religious societies bear the important ceremonial
obligation of eagle gathering, and each of these has a traditional area from which
it-and no other clan or society that is not related to it-may gather eagles. Hopi
clan ownership of traditional eagle nests is well documented in the anthropological
literature. The nests of eagles near village ruins are owned by the descendants of
clans which once lived in their neighborhood. The territory around the Hopi vil-
lages where eagles may be found is, and has been from time immemorial, divided
into portions or allotments, which are controlled by certain clans or families....
Clan ownership of eagle nesting areas corresponds to the early settlement areas and
migration routes of the clans before they arrived at their modem villages. The Hopi
regard the eagles as embodying the spirits of their ancestors, and the clan areas often
contain, or are very close to, Hopi clan ruins.
Religious Ceremonial Collection of Golden Eaglets From Wupatki National Monument, 66
Fed. Reg. 6516, 6517 (proposed Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7) (citation and
internal punctuation omitted). See also United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1302
(D.N.M. 1986) (noting that for members of the Katsina Society of the Isleta Pueblo "it is of
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Thus, Native American religions are situated differently from other
religions in the United States in three significant ways that potentially
justify some differential treatment: (1) they were created and exist only
here; (2) their beliefs are often unique and culture-encompassing; and (3)
those beliefs often revolve around sacred sites which are located only
here. Yet, these traits alone may not be sufficient to justify differential
legal treatment for discrimination based on an immutable characteristic
like ancestry. A fourth distinguishing characteristic, however, may well
supply the extra weight needed to tip the equity scales in that direction.
No group in the United States has been dispossessed of as much
land, or in such a systematic manner, as have Native Americans. As a
result of the federal government's allotment policy, for example, tribal
landholdings in the United States fell from 138 million acres to 52 mil-
lion acres from 1887 to 1934.77 And prior to that time, tribes had already
been deprived of most of their lands as a result of official federal poli-
cies, ranging from the removal policy of the early 1800s78 to the reserva-
tion policy, which confined them to areas much smaller than their tradi-
tional land base. 79 This massive land deprivation has been particularly
devastating to Native American religion because of the intimate connec-
tion Native Americans have between land and religion.80
Coupled with the other three distinctive features of Native Ameri-
can religions, this large-scale deprivation of land may suffice to justify
preferential treatment for Native American religions, particularly since
the deprivation occurred as a result of official governmental policy. The
Supreme Court has recognized that there are times when past govern-
mental discrimination justifies ancestry-based discrimination. 81  The
government's interest in eliminating the ongoing effects of past discrimi-
nation constitutes sufficient justification for such discrimination if (1) the
past discrimination is identified with sufficient particularity,82 and (2)
religious significance that these feathers be of a bird taken from aboriginal Isleta lands").
77. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 20 (1987).
78. See FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 78-92 (1982).
79. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 28-30 (4th ed. 2003).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76. As Justice Brennan once observed, "Na-
tive American faith is inextricably bound to the use of land." Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 460-61 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. "A State's interest in remedying the effects of past or present racial discrimination
may in the proper case justify a government's use of racial distinctions." Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899, 909 (1996). See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-506
(1989).
82. Government must "identify [the] discrimination ... with some specificity before they
may use race-conscious relief. A generalized assertion of past discrimination ... is not ade-
quate." Shaw, 517 U.S. at 899 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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there is a strong basis in evidence for concluding that remedial action is
still necessary. 83
Both of these conditions are arguably met in the context of the Na-
tive American religious experience in general, and with respect to eagle
feathers in particular. The discrimination being remedied is not merely
general societal discrimination against Native Americans, but rather the
government's systematic-and in some cases intentional 84-- disruption
of Native American religious practices, through outright bans on such ac-
tivity (such as the 1940 ban on the possession of bald eagle feathers), as
well as by denial of access to and control over sacred sites and other
critical lands, such as those from which eagle feathers must be gathered.
Moreover, there is strong evidence that the effects of this past discrimi-
nation are ongoing. Tribes continue to lack access to and control over
sacred sites,85 including those from which eagle feathers are to be gath-
ered,86 and in the absence of a religious exemption in the Eagle Protec-
tion Act, they would be prohibited from possessing any eagle feathers,
regardless of their source of origin.
Thus, preferential treatment for Native American religious prac-
tices, including the possession of eagle feathers, can arguably be justified
on the ground that Native Americans are sufficiently different from non-
Native Americans in relevant respects to satisfy the requirement that like
cases be treated alike.
But what of the requirement that Native Americans be members of a
federally recognized tribe? Is there any justification for preferring them
in religious matters over Native Americans who do not possess that po-
litical affiliation? After all, their ancestors were also here first; their cul-
tures may be just as religion-based; they, too, often have unique claims to
sacred sites in the United States; and they, too, were dispossessed of
much of their land (indeed, in many cases, of all their land). Is there any
possible justification for failing to treat them as favorably as Native
83. Id. at 910.
84. See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-
Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases,
49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 776-805 (1997) (describing government efforts to convert Native
Americans to Christianity and to outlaw some Native American religious practices, such as
ceremonial dances).
85. See, e.g., Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451-52 (rejecting tribal effort to prevent government deg-
radation of sacred area even though it might "virtually destroy the... Indians' ability to prac-
tice their religion" (internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally Dussias, supra note 84,
at 823-833.
86. See, e.g., Gunson, supra note 3, at 399-405 (describing conflict arising over National
Park Service denial of access to Wupatki National Monument to members of the Hopi tribe
wanting to take eagles from the area for religious purposes).
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Americans whose tribes are federally recognized? Again, arguably there
is.
B. Preferential Treatment for Federally Recognized Tribes: What's
Politics Got to Do with It?
At first glance, it may appear odd to attempt to justify religious
preferences on the basis of political status or citizenship. However, Na-
tive Americans who are members of federally recognized tribes are dif-
ferently situated from those who are not in three ways that arguably jus-
tify unique religious preferences.
First, as a result of constitutional history and current federal policy,
Native Americans who belong to federally recognized tribes are to some
extent subject to differing governmental norms than are Native Ameri-
cans who are not members of federally recognized tribes. The federal
government has, from the outset,87 generally dealt with Native Ameri-
cans on a tribal, rather than individual, basis, 88 and in doing so has dis-
tinguished between Native Americans who are citizens of sovereign enti-
ties89 with which the United States has a formal relationship (federally
recognized tribes) and those who are not. Because they owed allegiance
to another sovereign entity, those who belonged to a federally recognized
tribe were, from the beginning, immune from most state and federal
regulatory jurisdiction. 90 Consistent with American notions of freedom,
the Constitution also recognized that individual Native Americans could
disassociate themselves from their tribes and submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the federal and state governments. 91 Thus, in determining
the number of representatives a state was entitled to send to Congress,
the original Constitution provided that states were to exclude not all Na-
tive Americans, but only those who were "not taxed" 92 -that is those
87. The policy of treating tribes as sovereign nations predates the creation of the Ameri-
can republic. Great Britain pursued that policy as it dealt with tribes largely through diplo-
matic means and treaties, a process which assumes the sovereign status of both parties to the
treaty. See Cohen, supra note 78, at 57-58.
88. For example, the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate Commerce "with
the Indian Tribes" and not with all individual Indians. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis
added).
89. See Cohen, supra note 78, at 232-35.
90. See id. at 388 ("At the time of the Constitution, most tribal Indians were not subject
to ordinary federal or state legislation."). See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832) (holding state laws had no force in Indian Country).
91. See Cohen, supra note 78, at 388 (holding that "those few Indians who had severed
their tribal relations and individually joined non-Indian communities were considered to be
subject to ordinary laws").
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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who were immune from state and federal taxation because they were
citizens of a different nation which had been recognized by the federal
government as sovereign. 93 Those Native Americans who decided 94 to
sever their ties with their tribal governments and assimilate completely
into mainstream American society (thereby subjecting themselves to
taxation) were included in the count.
Accordingly, since the beginning of the Republic, the Constitution
has recognized that Native Americans who belong to federally recog-
nized tribes are differently situated from those who do not--one result
being that the two groups were, to some extent, subject to differing gov-
ernmental authority. This distinction survived passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which retained the exclusion for "Indians not taxed" in the
representation formula,95 and provided automatic citizenship to those
born in the United States only if they were "subject to the jurisdiction
thereof,"'96 a term clearly designed to distinguish members of federally
recognized tribes (who were tribal, not U.S., citizens and therefore not
subject to the full jurisdiction of the United States) from all others who
were born on American soil,97 including Native Americans who had not
belonged to any tribe which the United States had recognized.98
Full U.S. citizenship was granted to all Native Americans, including
those who were members of federally recognized tribes in 1924.99 How-
ever, membership in a federally recognized tribe continues to have sig-
nificance with respect to immunity from some state and federal regula-
tory schemes. Members of federally recognized tribes are exempt from
93. Cohen, supra note 78, at 388.
94. In Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99-104 (1884), the Supreme Court observed that prior
to enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the choice whether to become subject to the juris-
diction of the United States could not be made unilaterally by a tribal member. Even after the
tribal member severed his ties with the tribe, U.S. assent to citizenship was still required. See
id. The Court in Elk also ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment and implementing legislation
did not alter that requirement, though the dissent seems more persuasive on that point. See id.
at 110-11 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Williams, supra note 60, at 846 n.279.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
97. For a thorough explanation of the connection between the terms "Indians not taxed"
and those not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States, as well as the history behind the
phrases. see Williams, supra note 60, at 832-41.
98. In Elk, 112 U.S. at 102, the Supreme Court ruled that a Native American born in the
United States as a member of a federally recognized tribe was not automatically made a citizen
of the United States by the Fourteenth Amendment, nor by his voluntarily leaving the tribe. In
order for the latter act to be sufficient, the United States had to assent to the act. See id.
99. The Act made United States citizens of "all non-citizen Indians born within the terri-
torial limits of the United States." Indian Citizenship Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175,
43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000)).
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almost all state legislation l ° when they are in Indian Country. 101 They
also enjoy some immunity from otherwise applicable federal legislation
in some situations. 10 2 Much of that immunity stems from their member-
ship in a federally recognized tribe, 10 3 not from their ancestry.
By virtue of the same constitutional history and current policy, Na-
tive Americans who are citizens of federally recognized tribes are differ-
ently situated from other Native Americans in another related way. One
of the corollaries of having immunity from some state and federal regula-
tion is that Native Americans who are members of federally recognized
tribes are subject to tribal regulation and jurisdiction that do not apply to
Native Americans who are not members of such tribes. In the absence of
specific limitations, tribes clearly have jurisdiction to regulate the con-
duct of their own members within the confines of their territories. 104
100. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (tribal mem-
ber living and working on the reservation exempt from state income taxation).
101. Indian Country includes "(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation ...
(b) all dependent Indian communities ... , and (c) all Indian allotments the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished." 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000). Although § 1151 expressly ap-
plies only to the issue of criminal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has applied it in cases in-
volving civil jurisdiction as well. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522
U.S. 520, 527 (1998).
102. For example, in the absence of a statutory expression to the contrary, laws generally
applicable throughout the United States do not typically apply to lands under the control of
federally recognized tribes if (1) the law touches "exclusive rights of self-governance in purely
intramural matters;" (2) the application of the law to the tribe would "abrogate rights guaran-
teed by Indian treaties;" or (3) there is proof "by legislative history or some other means that
Congress intended [the law] not to apply to Indians on their reservations." Donovan v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). Similarly, gen-
eral federal criminal jurisdiction does not extend to "any Indian... who has been punished by
the local law of the tribe." 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000). Whether tribes have criminal jurisdiction
over Native Americans who are not members of the tribe (a prerequisite for the immunity
granted by § 1152), is still a matter of some dispute between Congress and the Supreme Court.
See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that federally recognized tribes lack inherent
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Native Americans); 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000)
("[T]he inherent power of Indian tribes [is] hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise crimi-
nal jurisdiction over all Indians."); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (upholding
Congress's power to enact § 1301(2), but not addressing the constitutionality of the statute
once applied). It is undisputed, however, that tribes have criminal jurisdiction (and can there-
fore punish) Native Americans who are members of the tribe. See United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313 (1978) (tribes have inherent criminal jurisdiction over tribal members).
103. For example, a state may tax the on-reservation sale of cigarettes to non-member Na-
tive Americans, see Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980), but not their sale to tribal members, Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991). Similarly, a state's ability to enforce
its laws in Indian Country is limited when it interferes with tribal self-government, see, e.g.,
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), an interest which is reduced when non-tribal members
are involved, see Colville, 447 U.S. at 160-61.
104. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (tribes have inherent criminal sover-
eignty over tribal members).
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Their authority over non-member Native Americans is not as clear, 10 5
and, in some cases, is plainly not as extensive as it is over tribal mem-
bers. 106
Native Americans who are members of federally recognized tribes,
therefore, have some choice as to the laws and norms (state, federal, or
tribal) to which they will be subjected. 10 7 In that respect, members of
federally recognized tribes are differently situated from other Native
Americans-not by virtue of their aboriginal status (which both groups
share), but by virtue of their unique "dual" citizenship. What might at
first seem like an arbitrary distinction between similarly situated indi-
viduals is in reality a logical consequence of long-standing historical and
constitutional practice reflecting the way in which the federal govern-
ment has chosen to deal with the indigenous population.
Again, however, justification for some differential treatment does
not necessarily justify differential treatment with respect to religious
practices. There must be some connection between the federally recog-
nized tribal member's dual citizenship status and religion in order for the
distinction to make a meaningful difference in the equality analysis.
That connection may be established by the second and third distinguish-
ing features of Native Americans belonging to federally recognized
tribes.
The second distinguishing feature is that Native Americans who are
members of federally recognized tribes are subject to governmentally
imposed religious norms and values in ways that other Native Americans
are not. This reality arises from the fact that, as noted above, there is a
close connection between many tribal cultures and tribal religions. Some
tribal governments are closely connected with tribal religions. Indeed,
some tribal governments still contain many features of their theocratic
traditions. 108 More importantly, all tribal governments have the power to
105. See supra note 102; Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 377 n.2 (2001) (Souter, J., con-
curring) (questioning the extent of inherent tribal civil jurisdiction over non-member Native
Americans).
106. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1923 (2000) (granting tribes
considerable-and sometimes exclusive-control over child custody proceedings involving
children who are tribal members).
107. The choice will largely be exercised in deciding to retain or renounce tribal member-
ship.
108. The Hopi Tribal Constitution, for example, grants special powers to traditional reli-
gious leaders known as Kikmongwi, who must certify village representatives to the tribal
council, HoPi TRIBAL CONST., art. IV, § 4, and who have the power to call for an election on
proposed village constitutions, Id. at art. III, § 4. Moreover, until otherwise organized, villages
are to be governed "under the traditional Hopi organization, and the Kikmongwi of such vil-
lage shall be recognized as its leader." Id. at art. III, § 3.
In recognition of the intimate connection between the government and religion in some tribes,
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establish legal norms for tribal members that reflect religious norms.
Thus, when members of federally recognized tribes exercise the choice
to subject themselves to tribal, rather than state or federal jurisdiction,
they will in many cases implicitly consent to adhere to some tribal reli-
gious norms. 109 Native Americans who do not belong to federally rec-
ognized tribes do not make a similar choice. Laws that distinguish be-
tween the religions of those two groups may, therefore, merely reflect the
reality that the religious beliefs and practices of the former group may be
shaped by a tribal sovereign, while the latter may not.
A federally recognized tribe's ability to insist on compliance with
some religious norms as a condition of tribal membership produces a
third distinguishing feature of Native Americans who belong to federally
recognized tribes. Native Americans who are members of federally rec-
ognized tribes may often be in a better position than other Native Ameri-
cans to provide courts with assurances that their religious liberty claims
are legitimate. Because RFRA requires claimants to demonstrate that the
challenged practice "substantially" burdens their free exercise of relig-
ion, the Act requires courts to determine the sincerity of the claimant's
belief that the impacted action is religious.110 Requiring Native Ameri-
can claimants of religious exemptions to belong to a federally recognized
tribe may aid courts in making this difficult determination, which has
also plagued the law in contexts other than RFRA.Ill To the extent that
when Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), which statutorily imposed many
of the restrictions in the Bill of Rights on Indian tribes, it excluded a prohibition against the
establishment of a religion. Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 'Indian
Civil Rights'Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557, 591-92 (1972).
109. There are, obviously, limits on a tribe's ability to require adherence to tribal religious
norms. The ICRA does prohibit a tribe from "mak[ing] or enforc[ing] any law prohibiting the
free exercise of religion." 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (2000). However, that provision may grant
tribal governments more leeway than the First and Fourteenth Amendments provide to federal
and state governments for two reasons. First, there are indications that the norms of the ICRA
are not identical to those in the Constitution. See e.g., Howlett v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes
of Flathead Reservation, 529 F.2d 233, 238 (9th Cir., 1976) (indicating that in some situations
the Equal Protection Clause of the ICRA "may be implemented somewhat differently than its
constitutional counterpart"); Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine
Ridge, 507 F.2d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 1975) (concluding that "the equal protection clause of
the ICRA is not coextensive with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution"); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971)
(ruling similar to Wounded Head). Second, following Martinez, interpretation of that particu-
lar provision of ICRA will be made by tribal courts in all cases not involving a writ of habeas
corpus. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). The leeway is extended even
further because of the absence of an establishment clause in ICRA. Allowing a tribe additional
leeway in enforcing religious norms is arguably justified by the fact that the tribal member can
always renounce her tribal membership.
110. Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2001).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 89-92 (1944) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)
10132005]
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
the particular conduct is identified as religious by the tribal entity, the
court can have greater assurance that the tribal member sincerely be-
lieves the challenged action is part of her religion. Moreover, a tribe's
acceptance of the claimant as a member could implicitly or expressly
(depending on the extent of the connection among tribal culture, tribal
government, and tribal religion) indicate tribal attestation of the religious
bona fides of the claimant. Native Americans who are not members of a
recognized tribe are not in a position to provide courts with that kind of
assistance and assurance, in part because they are not citizens of a sover-
eign which has established the kind of relationship with the federal gov-
ernment that allows courts to rely on their governmental determinations.
A federally recognized tribal member's ability to provide such as-
surance and assistance might not only make a difficult judicial task more
manageable, it might also prevent an anti-religious bias from creeping
into religious liberty jurisprudence. While courts addressing RFRA often
avoid the daunting task of measuring the substantiality of the burden on
the claimant's belief by assuming that the claimant sincerely believes the
conduct to be religious and the standard is met, one cannot help but won-
der if doubts about the matter unconsciously (or consciously) shape, the
analysis under the other prongs of the test. 112 Measures which prevent
that from happening-by giving courts greater confidence in addressing
the sincerity issue head-on-arguably promote the cause of religious lib-
erty in a way that provides some justification for preferential treatment.
Thus, for historical and policy reasons, Native Americans who are
members of federally recognized tribes are subject to differing govern-
mental norms and values than those who are not. Moreover, because of
the unique way in which tribal governments operate, those governmental
(noting that in Free Exercise cases, juries may decide whether defendants' religious beliefs
were sincerely held); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85 (1964) (noting
that Free Exercise claims require factfmder to decide sincerity of beliefs). Cf Ballard, 322
U.S. at 92-93 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting difficulty of determining sincerity of beliefs
without consideration of veracity of beliefs). See generally Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the
Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory of First Amendment Exemptions from Neu-
tral Laws of General Applicability, 66 Mo. L. REV. 9, 36-37 (2001); Kent Greenawalt, Judi-
cial Resolution of Issues About Religious Conviction, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 461, 462-63 (1998).
112. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit's overly generous deference to the government in Antoine,
see supra text accompanying notes 46-51, was the result of unarticulated suspicions about the
sincerity of Antoine's beliefs. The court noted that Antoine "claims" that exchanging eagle
feathers for goods and money is "part of [a] native custom... which to him has religious sig-
nificance." United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2003). It then indicated that
in light of its other analysis it saw no reason to disturb the district court's assumption that his
beliefs were sincere. Id. at 921 n.2. The court might have been more demanding of the gov-
ernment had Antoine been a member of a federally recognized tribe which provided evidence
that such a custom was indeed part of the tribal religious culture and that Antoine was indeed a
member in good standing.
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norms and values include religious norms and values. Finally, a feder-
ally recognized tribe's ability to impose those norms on its members (and
not others) makes it possible for them to assist in the proper development
of religious liberty jurisprudence 113 in ways that are not possible when
litigation involves Native Americans who are not members of a tribe.
Accordingly, the preference for members of federally recognized tribes
may well reflect genuine differences between the situation of such mem-
bers and other Native Americans.
One might still object to the preference for federally recognized
tribal members on the ground that Native Americans who are not part of
such tribes are ultimately being discriminated against based on their an-
cestry, rather than their political affiliation. After all, it was the actions of
their forbearers, not the current Native Americans, which led to the lack
of federal recognition. In the absence of the kinds of compelling differ-
ences noted in the prior section l1 4 (which do not apply to the tribal rec-
ognition differential), such ancestry-based discrimination may demand
more justification than the prior arguments in this section provide.
However, Native Americans whose tribes are not currently recog-
nized are not completely without recourse. Federal recognition is an on-
going process. A tribal group which demonstrates, among other things,
that it is a distinctive community which has been identified on a substan-
tially continuous basis as Native American can gain federal recognition
through an administrative process 115 or through congressional action,
116
thus placing them in the preferred category. Conversely, if a tribal group
cannot make that showing because it has lost connection to its aboriginal
roots, its members may not be situated that differently from non-Native
Americans, who are also not eligible for special protection. 117 Thus, the
113. If the tribal membership requirement does assist in the proper development of reli-
gious liberty jurisprudence, see supra text accompanying notes 103-04, and if that benefit is a
necessary part of the justification for granting preferential treatment to tribal members, the cur-
rent regulatory scheme may not be focused enough. It may not be enough that the person pos-
sesses the eagles for religious purposes and is a member of a federally recognized tribe; it may
also be necessary for the person to possess the feathers as part of a religious practice recog-
nized as bona fide by that particular tribe. Otherwise, the tribe might not be in a position to
assist the court in determining the religious bona fides of the tribal member. The language of
the current rule, which focuses in part on "[w]hether the applicant is... authorized to partici-
pate in bona fide tribal religious ceremonies," permits such an interpretation. 50 C.F.R. §
22.2(c)(2) (2004). It is unclear whether it is being enforced that way.
114. See supra Part II.A.
115. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2004) (listing mandatory criteria for recognition). This is not to
imply that federal recognition through the administrative process is easy. See Myers, supra
note 16.
116. See, e.g., Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1987, 25 U.S.C. § 1771 (2000) (recogniz-
ing the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head).
117. The arguments in favor of the political component of the exemption requirement do
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political discrimination imposed by the current scheme is flexible enough
to allow some self-correction along the way.
C. Lingering Doubts: Mixing Blood and Politics
Even if one accepts the arguments outlined above, there are still lin-
gering doubts about the compatibility of the current scheme with the ba-
sic concept of equality, doubts which emerge upon closer scrutiny of
some of those arguments. First, Native Americans may be less unique
with respect to religion than first appears. While it is true that Native
American religion existed here prior to any others that currently exist,
other religions have originated in the United States. The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints 118 and the Jehovah's Witnesses1 19 are just
two examples. While some of these groups now have strong bases out-
side the United States (so that their failure to exist here would not mean
their entire elimination), others exist predominantly here. 120 They, too,
may be threatened with extinction unless they are granted special protec-
tion.
Second, the exact boundaries between culture and religion are far
from clear. It is entirely possible that there is such a thing as an "Ameri-
can Mormon" culture, for example, which was created and exists only in
the United States. Furthermore, cultures (even in a broader sense) are
not as well-defined or as static as the above analysis may suggest. While
it is true that Native American culture exists only here, the same could be
said for African-American, or Asian-American cultures. Although these
cultures may trace a portion of their roots to other countries - and while
not appear to be as strong as they are for the racial component. See supra Part II.A. However,
they may nevertheless be sufficient, since discrimination based on race is more suspect, and
therefore more difficult to sustain, than discrimination based on political affiliation or citizen-
ship. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974) (characterizing employment pref-
erence for Native Americans as political rather than racial and applying lower standard of scru-
tiny). Moreover, use of the political component may be further justified by the fact that its
presence ameliorates some of the lingering concerns about the propriety of the racial compo-
nent. See supra Part II.C.
118. The LDS Church was organized in 1830 in Fayette, New York. THE DOCTRINE AND
COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, Preface to Section
21 at 40 (1981).
119. The Jehovah's Witnesses began in the early 1870s in Allegheny, Pennsylvania. Je-
hovah's Witnesses - Who Are They? What Do They Believe?, at http://www.watchtower.org/
library/jt/article_ 02.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
120. Examples include Church of God General Conference, with several thousand mem-
bers and headquartered in Morrow, Georgia, FRANK S. MEAD ET AL., HANDBOOK OF
DENOMINATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 31 (11th ed. 2001), and the Jesus People USA, a
Chicago-based religious group with a few hundred members, 1 EDWARD L. QUEEN II ET AL.,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS HISTORY 558 (rev. ed. 2001).
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they may have close counterparts in those countries - arguably, they are
also unique and exist only in the United States. Thus, unless longevity
by itself is the distinguishing relevant feature, Native American religious
culture may be less uniquely situated than first appears - perhaps enough
less to render preferential religious treatment on that basis somewhat
questionable.
Third, if preservation of Native American religious culture is the
compelling interest which justifies preferential treatment, it is not a fore-
gone conclusion that the goal is best, or even better, achieved by prohib-
iting non-Native Americans from participating in those religions, as the
Tenth Circuit noted in Hardman.121
Finally, with respect to the federally recognized tribal membership
distinction, the connection between tribal culture/religion and tribal gov-
ernment is not as close in some tribes as in others. Because of the lack of
care with which the federal government proceeded when enclosing Na-
tive Americans on reservations in the late 1800s, some federally recog-
nized tribes consist of native groups whose culture and language do not
match. 122 Indeed, in some cases, historical enemies were placed in the
same tribe. 123 Thus, the fit between the category of federally recognized
tribes and religion is less snug than the prior section makes it appear.
These lingering doubts may be addressed in a number of ways. One
is to point out the possible synergistic relationship between the two re-
quirements of the current exception (the Native American ancestry re-
quirement and the tribal membership requirement). The latter require-
ment (tribal membership) arguably addresses the lingering doubts about
the former (ancestry), and vice-versa.
For example, the concerns raised by the first three lingering doubts
(which are all doubts about whether distinctions based on ancestry are
valid) are ameliorated somewhat by requiring membership in a federally
recognized tribe. Even if other religions and cultures share some features
with Native American religions and cultures, none of them has been
treated as a sovereign entity, whose members are both subject to its coer-
cive governmental power (including power over religious matters) and,
at the same time, exempt to some extent from the coercive power of the
federal and state governments. Moreover, tribal membership require-
121. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1133 (10th Cir. 2002).
122. For example, membership in the Colorado River Indian Tribes extends to both Mo-
jave and Chemehuei Indians, as well as to some Hopi and Navajo. Kevin J Worthen, Two
Sides of the Same Coin: The Potential Normative Power ofAmerican Cities and Indian Tribes,
44 VAND. L. REv. 1273, 1295 (1991).
123. The Wind River Tribe is composed of both the Shoshone and their traditional ene-
mies, the Arapahoe. Id.
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ments provide some concrete defining point for determining the other-
wise vague boundaries of a culture. Native Americans who are members
of federally recognized tribes are truly unique in those respects, and that
uniqueness may justify treatment different from groups that otherwise
share somewhat similar circumstances.
Similarly, the last doubt (which concerns whether distinctions based
on federally recognized status can legitimately apply to culturally or re-
ligiously "mixed" tribes) may be ameliorated by emphasizing the simi-
larities which all aboriginal peoples share with one another, but which
differentiate them from non-Native Americans. Even those tribes which
are linguistically and culturally distinct from one another share some of
the common features which distinguish them from non-Native Ameri-
cans (and which are discussed in the first part of this section).
Still, the fit is concededly not exact. Not all federally recognized
tribes fit the profile set forth above, and some non-Native American reli-
gious groups share more in common with Native American religions than
with other non-Native American religions. There are at least two possible
responses to this reality.
One is to simply acknowledge that we live in a less than perfect
world and then conclude that this is the best we can do given the current
situation. The fact that we cannot undo the imperfect features of our past
treatment of Native Americans in a way that perfectly matches the rem-
edy with the harm should not prevent us from doing what we can (the
perfect not being allowed to be the enemy of the good, so to speak). Un-
der this view it is better to allow protection for some conduct that may
not deserve it, than to disallow all religious practices because the exact
line between what should be allowed and what actually is allowed cannot
be drawn precisely. This line of argument may be particularly compel-
ling in zero-sum situations, such as that involving eagle feathers, where
there has to be some basis for preferring some claims over others because
not all claims can be satisfied.
Alternatively, one could argue that the exception should be more
narrowly tailored so that it applies only to members of those groups
which meet all the requirements implicit in the arguments above. That
is, for example, one might conclude that eagle feather permits ought to
be issued only to members of groups who: (1) are aboriginal, (2) are cul-
turally and religiously integrated, (3) have an ongoing need for access to
eagle feathers for religious purposes, and (4) are federally recognized as
distinct sovereigns whose members are subject to their governmental ju-
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risdiction over religious matters and who are exempt to some extent from
the jurisdiction of other governments in our system.124
In any event, while strict equality may require narrower tailoring, it
seems that there are valid equality-based justifications for preferential
treatment for at least some Native Americans who are members of at
least some federally recognized tribes. This conclusion has some rele-
vance to the larger question concerning the general compatibility of reli-
gious exemptions with the demands of equality.
CONCLUSION: TENTATIVE LESSONS FROM THE NATIVE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE WITH EAGLE FEATHERS
As noted above, many scholars believe that the real question is not
whether exemptions which favor some religious practitioners over others
can be justified in a system committed to equality, but whether there is
ever sufficient justification for any religious exemptions in such a sys-
tem.125 While the analysis outlined above does not fully answer that
question, it does provide some tentative insights that could be useful in
the debate.
First, the Native American experience with eagle feathers provides
some insight into the potential benefits of religious exceptions in situa-
tions where religious liberty appears to be in conflict with other compel-
ling interests, such as the preservation of the eagle population. In such
cases, a regime that completely prohibits religious exemptions may fore-
close the possibility of resolving the conflict to the satisfaction of both
interests. If no religious exemptions were permitted in the eagle feather
situation, the government would be forced to decide either to outlaw all
possession of eagle feathers, thereby threatening the destruction of truly
unique religions and cultures for whom such use is essential, or to allow
everyone access to them, thereby threatening the extinction of the eagle.
Narrowly tailored religious exemptions may well allow accommodation
of both interests.
Second, the Native American experience with eagle feathers indi-
cates that religious exemptions may be particularly helpful and justifiable
in situations in which conflicts between religions present zero-sum situa-
tions.126 In such cases, neutrality (the concept at the heart of the no ex-
124. Arguably, the exemption should be narrowed even further to apply only to those who
use the feathers in a way sanctioned by the tribe to which they belong. See supra note 113.
125. See supra note 19.
126. Similar zero-sum situations may arise in other circumstances, such as when two
groups claim competing access to the same physical site.
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ception policy) 127 would seem to require that government deny all relig-
ionists access to the good, since the only other neutral option (granting
full access to both) is not physically possible. Permitting religious ex-
emptions, including those that in rare cases favor one religion over an-
other, can again allow for greater protection of religious liberty overall,
without offending the notion of equality, if one accepts the analysis set
forth above.
Finally, if one is persuaded by the analysis above that preferential
treatment in favor of particular religions can be justified in some situa-
tions, it seems likely that there are situations in which preferential treat-
ment in favor of all religions might be permissible-the former situation
being a subset of the latter in some respects. The Native American ex-
perience with respect to eagle feathers demonstrates that what at first ap-
pears to be unjustifiable inequitable treatment may in reality be wholly
sustainable equal treatment based on fundamental differences between
two seemingly similar groups. All that may be required is a deeper
analysis of the relevant characteristics. 128 The Native American experi-
ence with eagle feathers may therefore prove that, with more in-depth
analysis, the concepts of equality and religious exemptions can be com-
patible after all.
127. See SMITH, supra note 57, at 104 ("In its substantive content.., religious 'neutrality'
is a close corollary of, or even a virtual synonym for, the ideal of religious 'equality'....").
128. The relevant characteristics in the latter case will not be the same as in the former.
With the former, the question is whether the two groups are differently situated with respect to
religion. With the latter, the question would be a broader one, e.g., is religion situated differ-
ently from other interests with respect to liberty? See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The
Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37
(2002).
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